














Specific vs. Generic sense of pleasure 
 
 Sometimes we say that pleasure is distinct form joy, happiness, or good mood. 
Some other times we say the joy, happiness or good mood are types of pleasure. This suggests 
the existence of two concepts of pleasure: one specific, the other generic. According to the 
specific concept, pleasure is one type of positive affects among others. Pleasure is to be 
distinguished from joy, gladness, contentment, merriment, glee, ecstasy, euphoria, 
exhilaration, elation, jubilation; happiness, felicity, bliss, well-being; enjoyment, amusement, 
fun, rejoicing, delectation, enchantment, delight, rapture, relish, thrill; satisfaction, 
gratification, pride, triumph; good mood, jollity, gaiety, cheerfulness; relief (or at least from 
some of these concepts). 
 According to the generic concept of pleasure, a pleasure is any of these positive 
affects. Joy, gladness, contentment, merriment, glee, ecstasy, euphoria, exhilaration, elation, 
jubilation, happiness, felicity, bliss, well-being, enjoyment, amusement, fun, rejoicing, 
delectation, enchantment, delight, rapture, relish, thrill, satisfaction, gratification, pride, 
triumph, good mood, jollity, gaiety, cheerfulness, relief and pleasure in the specific sense are 
all species of pleasures. In this thesis, I shall focus on the generic concept of pleasure, in order 
to address the question “what is the property of pleasantness common to all positive affects?” 
In order to address this question nevertheless, one need to have at least rough grip on pleasure 
in the specific sense and on what distinguishes it from other positive affects. I shall therefore 
start by hinting at the problem of the definition of the specific concept of pleasure. 
 
Specific pleasure as bodily pleasure 
 
One uncontroversial point about the specific concept of pleasure is that it encompasses 
bodily pleasures, such as the pleasure we feel in entering in a hot bath, in being caressed, in 
stretching one’s limbs, in having an orgasm or in eating a florentine. These are bodily 
pleasures in the sense of being felt as located in some parts of our body. Bodily pleasures are 
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often taken to be equivalent with sensory pleasures, but this is misleading.  The pleasure we 
take in looking at certain photographs is a sensory pleasure, but it is not obviously felt as 
being located somewhere in our body: where does exactly the photograph pleases us (in our 
eyes?)? Sensory pleasures are pleasures that arise from the use of our senses, by contrast to 
pleasure that arise from the use of our imagination or understanding for instance. Some of 
these sensory pleasures may be bodily. This is often (but not always) the case with tactile or 
gustative pleasures. But some of them can also be non-bodily. This is often (but not always) 
the case with visual pleasures. The distinction between bodily and non-bodily pleasures on the 
one hand, and sensory and non-sensory pleasures on the other, are orthogonal. The first one 
concerns the spatial phenomenology of pleasure. The second one concerns the faculties our 
pleasures arise from.   
Though the idea that specific pleasures include bodily pleasures in uncontroversial, 
one more disputed issue is whether all specific pleasures are bodily pleasures. Are there are 
also non-bodily specific pleasures? Or do every putative non-bodily pleasures amount to joy, 
enjoyment or any other positive affect? In order to answer this question, one has to determine 
which other criteria of distinction can be used among positive affects, apart from the 
bodily/non-bodily one, in order catch pleasure in the specific sense. 
 (1) One first criterion is intensity. Euphoria is a more intense positive affects than 
gladness. Unfortunately, intensity seems to be of no help if one is to contrast specific pleasure 
with other positive affects since specific pleasure can be more or less intense. An orgasm is a 
very intense specific pleasure, while the pleasure that result from blowing in one’s cold hands 
is more moderate. 
 (2) One second criterion distinguishes between what can be called transitive and 
non-transitive affects1. Some positive affects such as enjoyment, amusement, rejoicing, 
delectation, enchantment, delight or rapture appears to be directed at an external object: one 
enjoy something, one take delight ore rejoice in something, or goes into rapture about 
something or somebody. Such affect may be called transitive. One the other hand, some other 
affect appears to be directed at nothing else than themselves or the subject that has them: this 
might be the case of gladness, contentment, merriment, glee, ecstasy, euphoria, exhilaration, 
elation, jubilation; happiness, felicity, bliss or well-being. One can be happy, or euphoric 
without being aware of any object toward which our positive state is directed. Arguably, 
specific pleasure should be considered as a non-transitive affect. The reason why is that 
                                            
1 D. Armstrong (1962) makes a similar distinction between transitive and non-transitive bodily sensations. 
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bodily pleasure aren’t obviously directed at something else that themselves. Even if one thinks 
that bodily pains are directed at bodily damages, there are no obvious analogues for bodily 
pleasures. How is this transitive/intransitive distinction between positive affects to be 
understood? 
A first strong interpretation is to read it as a distinction between intentional and non-
intentional positive affects. Enjoyment would be an intentional state, contrary to ecstasy or 
specific pleasure. Thus, Duncker (1941) claims that pleasure is a non-intentional phenomena, 
contrary to joy which is intentional (Duncker also believes that pleasure is a sensory 
phenomena while joy is a non-sensory one, so that bodily and non-intentional mental states 
are coextensive2). There are nevertheless reasons to doubts that this is the case. First, such a 
view implies that there are non-intentional mental states, a view that it would be better to 
avoid. Second, the difference between transitive and intransitive positive affects doesn’t seem 
to be of real ontological significance: it seems rather to be a matter of “accent”. One reason 
why the distinction shouldn’t be taken too seriously is that most of non-transitive affects are 
sometimes described as being directed at an external object (one can be happy that something 
is the case, to feeling exhilarated by something or to take pleasure in something); and that 
many transitive affects are sometimes referred to without any mention of their object. We 
shouldn’t take this to imply that there is no distinction between transitive and non-transitive 
affect nevertheless. 
A better proposal is to claim that while both types of affect are intentional (=are 
directed toward an object beyond themselves), in transitive affects, the attention is typically 
directed outward (= toward the intentional object) while in non-transitive affects, the attention 
is typically directed inward (=toward the intentional act). Transitive affects are usually 
transparent to the attention: the attention goes directly to the intentional objects of those 
affects. So a plausible claim is that in specific pleasure the attention usually focus one the 
intentional act, while in joy or other transitive affects the attention focuses on the intentional 
object.  
 
(3) A third criterion of distinction among the positive affects contrasts occurrent 
affects, with dispositional ones. Good mood, jollity, gaiety, cheerfulness appear to be 
dispositions to react positively various stimuli: one feel well-disposed. One the other hand, 
                                            
2 Note that the sense in which Duncker uses « intentional » is quite pecular. For him, intentionality doesn’t refer 
to a mental act being directed at an object distinct from itself, but to a mental act directed at an object external to 
the subject of the mental act. In Duncker’s use of « intentional », there is no room for intentionality whose object 
is internal to the subject: to take pleasure in a sensation isn’t, according to him, an intentional phenomena. 
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pleasure in the specific sense, joy, gladness, contentment, merriment, glee, ecstasy, euphoria, 
exhilaration, elation, jubilation, enjoyment, amusement, fun, rejoicing, delectation, 
enchantment, delight, rapture, relish, thrill, satisfaction, gratification, pride, triumph appear to 
be occurent states.  
 (4) A fourth criterion contrasts long-term states, with short-terms episodes. Happiness, 
felicity, bliss, well-being are typically long-terms states, contrary to pleasure in the specific 
sense, and other positive affects such as ecstasy, euphoria, jubilation or enjoyment. Note 
nevertheless that some people deny that there is any significant distinction between pleasure 
and happiness. Eudaimonist conceptions of pleasure reduce pleasure to happiness (David, 
1982). Hedonic conceptions of happiness, on the opposite, reduce happiness to sum of 
pleasures (F. Feldman, 2006). Haybron (2002) argues against both kinds of reductionism and 
claims that pleasure and happiness are indeed two primitive types of affective phenomena. 
If these remarks are true, specific pleasures are (2) salient to the attention (3) occurent 
and (4) short-term. In order to determine whether all specific pleasures are bodily pleasures, 
on can wonder whether there are non-bodily positive affects that exemplify those four 
properties. Plausibly, though many intellectual positive affects are occurent, short-term and 
evaluative, none of them are salient to the attention, in the sense of eclipsing their object. It 
seems hard to imagine a case of intellectual (specific) pleasure where the pleasant object isn’t 
consciously represented3. By contrast, what can easily conceive of an intense pleasure in a 
part of our body without any awareness of the pleasant object. This suggests that pleasures in 
the specific sense can be equated with bodily pleasures. Though this would require further 
justification, I shall assume in the following that the specific concept of pleasure amounts to 
the concept of bodily pleasures, that is, pleasure that are felt to be located in our body. 
If so, the distinction between the specific sense and the generic sense of pleasure can 
be spelt out as follows: in a restricted sense, pleasure refers to bodily pleasure only. In a more 
generic sense, bodily pleasures are only one kind of pleasure among other. There are also non-
bodily pleasures, pleasures that aren’t exhausted by bodily sensations. This is this generic 
sense of pleasure that shall interest us in the following. I shall from now on use the term 




                                            
3 To say that we « feel good » is one possible counterexample, but it is not clear that the expression refers to an 
occurent state rather that a dispositional one. 
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 Pleasantness as the essential property of generic pleasures 
 
 Whatever the right definition of specific pleasure, there is also a generic concept of 
pleasure that encompass every positive affects. The main difficulty, relatively to generic 
pleasure is to understand what unifies it, that is, how are we to account for the property of 
pleasantness shared by all positive affects? 
This is the problem of explaining why generic pleasures constitute a natural class. 
Why does the list “joy, happiness, good mood, rapture, enjoyment, well-being, delight, 
contentment, ecstasy, satisfaction euphoria, enjoyment, bliss, pride, enchantment” sounds 
natural (non arbitrary)? In virtue of what do we include “joy” in this list, but not “sadness”, 
“shame”,  “boredom”,  “indifference”, “perception”, “desire” or “belief”? What makes the 
following examples instances of pleasure, despite their diversity: looking at a beautiful 
photograph, entering in a hot bath, playing badminton, winning the game, looking for the 
answer of a mathematical problem, finding the answer, feeling proud, laughing, feeling a pain 
decreasing, making love, having an orgasm, eating chocolate, being complimented, enjoying a 
movie count as pleasures? 
We may call this problem  of explaining what all diverse (generic) pleasures have in 
common the problem of the unity of pleasure. This is the problem I shall be interested in this 
thesis. 
I shall call pleasantness, whatever it is, the property that all pleasures have in 
common. Pleasantness is the property in virtue of which all the items in this list count as 
pleasure. If something is a pleasure, it is a pleasure in virtue of exemplifying pleasantness. 
Since pleasantness is the property shared by all positive affects, pleasantness is just another 
name for the positive element in positive affects, what I shall call their positive hedonic 
valence. Pleasantness (or positive hedonic valence), is the unifying property of pleasures (or 
positive affects). I shall therefore admit the following definition: 
 
  D1 x is a pleasure =df x is pleasant 
 
Such a definition may seem controversial. It assumes that exemplifying pleasantness is 
necessary and sufficient in order to be a pleasure. The problem comes from sufficiency: one 
may object that certain things are pleasant but aren’t pleasures: a pleasant journey. The 
answer to this worry is, I submit, that “pleasant” is ambiguous. A journey, a story or a 
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situation are not pleasant in the same sense than a sensation, a feeling or an emotion are. 
“Pleasant” apply either to the object of our mental states, or to the mental states themselves. 
One should distinguish therefore between and objectual and an mental sense of “pleasant”. 
Here I shall use the term in the mental sense: only mental states can be pleasant. Journeys, 
movies or evenings are pleasant in another sense, the objectual one.  
 
A further thesis, that isn’t needed here though, is to claim that “pleasant” in the mental 
sense in more fundamental that “pleasant” in the objectual sense. According to this thesis, 
journeys, movies and evenings are pleasant only in a derived sense, because they are the 
objects of our pleasant states in the mental sense. The mental sense would be the most literal 
and strict one. If some objects are pleasant, this is because there are the object of some 
pleasant mental states. This amounts to say that objectual pleasantness is never an intrinsic 
property of the object: it depends of it being the object of an mental act.  Though this sounds 
plausible to me, I don’t need to commit myself to such a priority thesis of mental pleasantness 
over objectual one. The only points here are that those two senses should be distinguished and 
that the above definition (D1) relies on the mental sense. 
 
 Pleasantness and its opposites.  
 
 Pleasures are therefore those mental states that exemplify the property of pleasantness, 
that is, or positive valence, however we construe it. The antonym (polar opposite) of pleasure 
if sometimes held to be pain. Nevetheless, since pain is often restricted to bodily sensation, 
pain is better construe as the antonym of bodily pleasure that is, of pleasure in the specific 
sense. The antonym of pleasure in the generic sense is better called displeasure. S. Rachels 
(2004) argues that “unpleasure” should be preferred to “displeasure” because “displeasure” 
connotes disapproval. But unpleasure has also a restricted sense, connoted by psychoanalysis. 
And more importantly “un-” is basically a privative prefix, while “dis-” expresses contrariety. 
Therefore it seems to me that the word “displeasure” is a lesser evil in order to designate the 
antonym of pleasure. 
 Following Hamilton (vol. 2, p. 436-437), the relations between pleasure and its 
opposites go as follows (Hamilton uses pain instead of displeasure): 
 
 Pleasure and pain are opposed to each other as contraries, not as contradictories, that 
is, the affirmation of the one implies the negation of the other, but the negation of the 
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one does not infer the affirmation of the other; for there may be a third or intermediate 
state, which is neither one of pleasure nor of pain but one of indifference. 
 












 Note first that while the essential property of pleasure is pleasantness, the essential 
property of displeasure is called unpleasantness (which may be a further argument in favour 
of Rachel’s terminological choice). This is somewhat unfortunate because “un-” being 
privative, “unpleasant” may also mean “non-pleasant”. “Dis-” is here again a better prefix that 
always expresses contrariety, but unfortunately the words “displeasant” and “displeasantness” 
don’t exist. 
 Second, displeasure is not the only contrary of pleasure: presumably, pleasure has also 
contraries of the same sign. For instance, an experience cannot be both extremely and 
moderately pleasant (just as the same water cannot be both extremely hot and warm at the 
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same time). Nevertheless, displeasure is the only antonym, or polar opposite of pleasure: 
displeasure is the only contrary of pleasure that is of opposite sign. 
 
 
Some definitions of pleasantness 
 
 To say that pleasantness is the essential property of pleasure doesn’t commit us to 
any particular view of pleasantness (except to the view that pleasantness is a property of 
mental states). Here are some of the main definitions of pleasantness, all of them being 
compatible with the view that pleasantness is the unifying property of pleasures (where x is 
always a mental state). In order to answer the problem of the unity of pleasures, one has to 
endorse one of those definitions of pleasantness (or another one) or a conjunction of them. 
 
D2  x is pleasant =df x exemplifies a primitive phenomenological property, the hedonic 
tone. The unifying property of all positive affects is unanalysable and 
phenomenological. (C.D. Broad, 1930 ; M. Schlick, 1939;  Duncker, 1941 ; 
Penelhum, 1975 ; I. Goldstein, M. Aydede, 2001 ; I. Johansson, 2001.) 
 
Remorse, which is memory of certain events, having a certain 
emotional tone, is plainly a pain as much as toothache. And hope, 
which is expectation of certain events, having a certain emotional 
tone, is plainly as much a pleasure as the sensation of smell which we 
get from a rose or a violet. C.D. Broad, 1930 :  230. 
 
D3 x is pleasant =df x exemplifies a primitive hedonic value. The unifying property of 
  all positive affects is unanalysable and axiological. 
 
D4 x is pleasant =df x is a primitive attitude of taking pleasure in. The unifying 
property of all positive affects is unanalysable, it is a primitive mode of 
intentional reference. (Brentano, Olson, Bengtsson, to appear) 
To feel pleasure or delight is an emotional act, a taking pleasure or a 
loving; it always has an object, is necessarily a pleasure in something 
which we perceive or imagine, have an idea of. For example, sensual 
pleasure has a certain localised sense quality as its object. (Brentano, 
1973, p. 164). 
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D5 x is pleasant =df x is the perception/intuition of a positive value. The unifying 
  feature of all positive affects is analysable in terms of their intentional object. 
  (Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz, Wolff4) 
 
All our pleasure is nothing more than the consciousness of some one 
or other off our perfections” Descartes, Lettre à Elisabeth5 
 
D6 x is pleasant =df x is liked. The unifying property of all positive affects is 
analysable in terms of their being the object of a certain attitude (liking).  
 
The unpleasantness of pain sensations consists in their being disliked 
(R.J. Hall, 1989: 646)6 
 
D7 x is pleasant =df if x is desired. The unifying property of all positive affects is 
  is analysable in terms of their being the object of a certain attitude (desire)7. 
 
We have identified the generic class of « pleasure » as the set of all 
feelings we desire or wish to sustain or cultivate, and the generic class 
of « pain » as the set of all feelings we wish or desire to eliminate and 
avoid (R.B. Edwards, 1979 : 92-3). 
 
 
D8 x is pleasant =df x represents a desire as satisfied. The unifying property of all 
positive affects is analysable in terms satisfaction of desire. (Stewart, Hume, 
Hamilton, Green, von Hartmann, Natorp, Scheler McDougall, 1923, 1928 1936 ; 
Allen, 1930, Sigdwick, 1930 , D.M. Armstrong, 1968 ; R. Roberts, 2003 ; T. 
Schroeder, 2004) 
 
To be pleased is (at least) to represent a net increase in desire 
satisfaction ; to be displeased is to represent a net decrease in desire 
                                            
4 see Hamilton, Vol II, Lect. XLIII, p. 460 ff. for a presentation of the difference between their views. 
5 Also quoted by Hamilton, Lecture XLIII, p. 460. Hamilton answers to this suggestion as follows : 
 Pleasure is a feeling, and a felling is a merely sbujective state, that is, a state which ha sno reference to 
anything beyond itself, —which exists only as we are conscious of its existence. Now, then, the perfection or 
imperfection of an object, considered in itself, and as out of relation to our subjective states, is thought, —is 
judged, but is not felt ; and this jugment is not pleasure or pain, but approbation or disapprobation, that is, an act 
of the cognitive faculties, but not an affection of the capacities of feeling. In this point of view, therefore, the 
definition of pleasure, as the cognition ofa any sort of perfection, is erroneous. », Vol II, Lecture XLIII, p. 463 
6 see also C.D.  Broad (1930 : 234 ff.): « this experience pof mine is pleasant » means « I  like this 
experience for its non-hedonic qualities ». Also quoted by Rachels (2000). 
7 S. Rachels (2000) clearly distinguishes between D6 and D7 which are sometimes mixed up. 
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satisfaction. Intensity of pleasure or displeasure represents degree of 
change in desire satisfaction. (Schroeder, 2004 : 90) 
 
 
D9 x is pleasant =df x is the unimpeded exercise of an activity. (Aristotle, Du Bos, 
Pouilly, Sulzer8) 
 
D10 x is pleasant =df x is the absence or end of pain. (Plato, Philèbe; J. Locke , 
Genovesi, Verri9, Kant, Von Frey 189410) 
 
 
 I shall defend D3, the view that pleasantness is a basic kind of value. But let us first 
have a look on the different ways those definitions can be classified. A first distinction 
contrasts conative views of pleasure with non-conative ones. A second distinction contrasts 
primitivist views of pleasure with reductionist ones. A third distinction contrasts realist views 
of pleasure with anti-realist ones.  Let us review those three distinctions in turn. 
 
 
Primitivist vs. Reductionist views of pleasantness 
 
 A first distinction contrasts primitivist views of pleasure with non-primitivist ones. 
According to primitivism about pleasure (D2, D3, D4) pleasantness is an unalysable simple 
property (phenomenological, axiological or intentional). Non-primitivist views of 
pleasantness consider it as a complex, analysable property. D10, the view that pleasantness is 
the absence or end of an pain, deserves special attention here. In a sense, it is a reductionist 
view of pleasantness, since it defines pleasantness in terms of pain. But in another, it is a 
primivist view insofar as it takes pain, which is an affective phenomenon, to be primitive. One 
may say that D10 is a form of hedonic reductionism but a form algedonic primitivism 
(“hedonic” being relative to pleasure only, “ algedonic” being relative to both pleasure or 
displeasure)11. 
                                            
8 See Hamilton, Vol. II, Lect XLIII p. 465 for references. 
9 Genovesi and Verri are mentionned by Hamilton, Vol. II, Lect XLIII, p. 471. 
10 Quoted by Titchener, 1908: 82 
11 Of course, D10 can only be a form of algedonic primitivism if pain itself is taken to be unanalysable. This is 
not the case, for instance in Kant. Kant (Anthropologie d’un point de vue pragmatique) defines pleasure the 
absence of pain, and pain as the feeling of the hindrance of life. That is, Kant assumes a definition of pain close 
to D8 (desire’s satisfactionism) or D9 (pain as impeded activity). 
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 Note that reductionism here refers to some kind of “horizontal” reduction rather than to 
“vertical” reduction. What is at stake is the reduction of pleasure to other kinds of mental 
states, and not the reduction of pleasure to physical or biological processes.  One important 
rationale for reductionism is the common bipartition of psychological states into cognitions 
and conations (beliefs and desires for instances). This distinction may appear to be exhaustive 
insofar as we take the notion direction of fit as the basic criterion for distinguishing types of 
mental states and admit that there are only two direction of fit: the mind-to-world direction of  
cognitions ; the world-to-mind direction of conations. Prima facie, pleasure and displeasure 
aren’t obviously cognitions, conations, nor  mixes of the two. This is one reason why 
reductionist views of pleasantness are interesting. Despite the recentness of the expression 
« direction of fit » (which is due to E. Anscombe and was popularized by J. Searle), the 
concept itself, and the problem it raises for the definition of pleasantness was seen before. 
Here is a quotation of Krug (given by Hamilton, ref) which clearly express this worry: 
 
The powers of cognition and the powers of conation are, in propriety, to be 
regarded as two different fundamental powers, only because the operation of our 
mind exhibits a twofold direction of its whole activity, —one inwards, another 
outwards; …  
Now this activity of feeling must necessarily have either a direction inwards, or a 
direction outwards, or both directions at once, or finally neither of the two, that is, 
no direction at all; for apart from the directions inwards and outwards, there is no 
direction conceivable. But, in the first case, the activity of feeling would not be 
different from the cognitive activity, at least not essentially; in the second case 
there is nothing but a certain appetency manifested under the form of a feeling; in 
the third, the activity of feeling would be only a combination of theoretical and 
practical activiy; consequently, there remains only the supposition that I has no 
direction. We confess, however, that an hypothetical activity of such a kind we 
connate imagine to ourselves as a real activity. 
 
  One important advantage of the reductionist definitions of pleasantness is their ability 
to answer Krug’s worry. I shall argue nevertheless in favour of a form of primitivism, which 
implies that pleasantness has no direction of fit12. If so, we face the following dilemma: either 
intentionality isn’t the mark of the mental (there are mental states without any direction of fit) 
or pleasantness isn’t a mental property. I shall defend the second answer: pleasantness is a 
                                            
12 The implication from primitivism (non-reducibility to cognition or conation) to the non-intentionality of 
pleasantness may sounds odd regarding D4 (the view that pleasantness is basically an intentional attitude of 
taking pleasure in). I shall argue latter that the implication is true, and that it is D4 which is inconsistent in this 
respect. 
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basic kind of value. Though it is exemplified only by mental states, it is not itself a mental 
property, but an axiological one. 
 
Conative vs. non-conative views of pleasantness 
 
 A second distinction contrasts conative and non-conative views of pleasure. Conative 
views of pleasure analyse pleasure in terms of conations, such as desire. D7 and D8 are the 
two main ones, as well shall see. But we should note that the Aristotelian definition of 
pleasure in terms of unimpeded activity (D9), when activity is analysed with the help of some 
conation (volition, striving, trying…), may also count as a conative view. 
 Conative view of pleasantness are a sub-types of reductionist view of pleasantness. 
They inherit the advantages of these view, namely they fit with the bipartition of the mind into 
cognitions and conations. One further advantage of the conative view of pleasantness is that 
they give a straightforward explanation of the connexion between pleasure and motivation. 
While the views that define pleasure as an object of desire (D7) are commited to some form of 
psychological hedonism (the view that every conation as pleasure for its object), the views 
that define pleasure as a satisfaction of desire (D8) are often commited to the opposite view 
that pleasure is only a by-product of our conations, but not their aim. 
 
Realist vs. Anti-realist views of pleasantness 
 
 Realism about x is often defined in terms of x existing independently of the mind. 
Such a definition raises two difficulties if one wishes to make sense of pleasure realism. (i) 
First pleasantness has been defined as a property of mental states exclusively. (ii) Second, 
pleasantness is often claimed to be necessarily conscious. Both contentions appear to imply 
that pleasantness is essentially mind-dependent. I shall argue that this isn’t the case. 
 (i) Does the fact that pleasantness is an exclusive property of mental states entails anti-
realism about pleasantness? Such an impression follows from a too rough definition of 
realism. Realism, correctly defined, is not (only) the claim that x exist independently of the 
mind, but rather the claim that x exists independently of the mental act that takes x for its 
object. Independence of the mind means indeed independence from being (re)presented by the 
mind. Pleasantness, in many of the definitions above, is indeed dependent of the mind, but it 
isn’t dependent on it being (re)presented by the mind, that is, on it being the object of a 
mental act. The only two definitions that are clearly anti-realist then are D6 (pleasant = being 
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like) and D7 (pleasant = being desired). None of the other definitions explicitly claims that 
pleasantness is dependent on a mental state whose it is the object: they are therefore realists 
definitions of pleasure. 
 Incidentally, it is sometimes claimed that definitions of realism in terms of mind-
independence cannot make room for realism about mental states. The very same answer can 
be given to such a worry: a mental states is real if and only if it is existentially independent of 
any other (second order) mental state whose it would be the object13. The only way to be ant-
realist about everything then, it to engage either into an infinite regress and to claim that every 
mental states that exist, is the object of a second order mental state, which is in turn the object 
of a third order mental state…; or into a circularity regress and to claim that every mental 
states that exists is the object of another mental state, which is also the object of the first 
mental state. 
 (ii) The second objection to the possibility of pleasure realism is the following: if 
pleasure is necessarily conscious, then pleasure appear to be existentially dependent on an act 
of consciousness whose it is the object, and therefore, pleasure anti-realism is the only 
possible option.  
 A first and straightforward answer to it is to deny that pleasure is necessarily 
conscious. Nevertheless, for the sake of the argument, I shall try to answer the objection while 
granting that premise. 
 A second answer is to claim that “x is conscious” does not amount to “x is the object 
of another act of consciousness”. To claim to pleasantness is conscious, rather, would be to 
claim that pleasantness is reflectively conscious: it is not conscious in virtue of being the 
object of another, second order, mental act. It is only conscious of itself, it is its own object. If 
this true, then a slight revision of the definition of realism can ensure the possibility of 
pleasure realism: one can claim that in order for x to be real, x as to be dependent of a mental 
state distinct from itself, that takes it for its object. If pleasure is necessarily conscious, this is 
not, according to the present hypothesis, in virtue of it being the object of another mental act, 
but in virtue of being sui-referential. Therefore, pleasure realism can be a viable option. 
 Such a self-reflective view of pleasantness nevertheless is controversial. First, it is not 
clear how a same property of pleasantness can be at once what any one of the above 
definitions claims that it is and an intentional property making reference to itself. These are, 
for instance, two very different things to be a value (D3) and to be self-conscious. How a 
                                            
13 This idea is put forward by J.Heil, 2003 : 58-59. 
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single property of pleasantness could achieve those two tasks remain mysterious. Second, 
circularity, or self-reflexivity, has many of the appearances of a deus ex machina, a queer and 
ad hoc property in order regression problems.  Third, self-reflexivity of pleasantness is 
plausibly committed to the Cartesian view that consciousness of pleasantness is infallible. But 
to claim that every pleasure is conscious is clearly different from claiming that every 
consciousness of pleasure is veridical. One can, for instance, be conscious of a pleasure, but 
not in the right way (to take it for more intense that it is for instance); or one can have the 
impression that one is pleased, even if it is not the case. Such possibilities shouldn’t at least be 
dismissed right away, from the mere claim that every pleasure is conscious. 
 The third and right answer, I submit, in order to make pleasure realism compatible 
with the claim that every pleasure is conscious if the following one. The reason why pleasure 
is necessarily conscious might not lie in the nature of pleasantness, but in the nature of 
consciousness. After all, none of the above definitions of pleasantness mentions 
consciousness. Consciousness, on the other hand, may be essentially pleasure-attracted. In 
other words, what grounds the fact that all pleasures are conscious, if it is a fact, may be an 
essential property of consciousness, not an essential property of pleasure. If so, pleasure is 
necessarily conscious not because it is what is it, but because consciousness is what it is. This 
suggests that pleasure realism can be true even if all pleasures are the objects of 
consciousness. 
This answer relies on the idea that the fact that x (pleasantness) cannot exist without y 
(consciousness) isn’t sufficient for having an existential dependence between x and y. 
Existential dependence shouldn’t be defined in modal terms. The general problem with the 
modal approach of existential independence is that it registers only the fact that in each world 
where x exists, y exists, but it remains silent about the source of such a modal correlation. The 
correlation may be due to the nature of x, but it may as well be due to the nature of y. We wish 
to exclude the latter case. Let us take an example from the domain of perception. Suppose that 
God exists, that he is a necessary being, that he sees everything, that he created the world and 







According to the modal notion of independence, the world then existentially depends 
on the perception of God: no objects are real since nothing could possibly exist without his 
perception14. Therefore, the mere existence of an all-knowing God undermines realism. But 
this is strongly counter-intuitive: for even if the world can’t exist without being perceived by 
God, this is not because God perceives it that the world exists. The world appears to follow its 
course independently of any perception of God. God’s perceptions are here incidental 
relatively to ontological status of the world. Yet the Modal view of Independence implies that 
they determine its reality. So the Modal view of Independence appears to be false: possibly 
existing unperceived is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for existential 
independence. In the same way, pleasure need not to possibly exist unconsciously in order to 
be real.  
If the modal account of existential is wrong, what positive account of existential 
independence can we use in order to define realism? K. Fine (1995) and J. Lowe (1998) have 
proposed to define existential dependence with the help of the notion of the identity (or 
                                            
14 I’ve adapted the God example proposed by P. Simons (1987: 295) to the case of perception. For more detailed 
critics of the modal conception of dependence, see Fine 1994, 1995; Lowe 1998, chap. 6; Correia, 2005. Jenkins 
(xxx) applies this critic to the definition of realism. 
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essence) of an object15. The notion of essence is taken to be modally irreducible: the essence 
of a thing is what makes it what it is, its real definition (Fine, 1994). Every essential property 
is a necessary property but not every necessary property is essential. To take an example from 
Fine, it is necessary that Socrates is distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but this is not essential to 
him. In the same way, it is necessary that if I exist, then 2+2 = 4, but I’m not essentially 
dependent on 2+2+ = 4.The idea is then that x depends on y if and only if the existence of x 
necessarily implies the existence of y in virtue of the identity of x. In other words, the source 
of the dependence must rely in the dependent object in order to avoid the conclusion that 
everything is dependent on necessary beings (God, the number 2). This solves the problem of 
the all-seeing God: it is true that the world can’t exist without being perceived by God, but 
this is not true in virtue of the nature of the world. What the world is doesn’t necessitate that 
God perceives it (though it may necessitate that God created it). We arrive at the following 
essential definition of independence:  
 
 (EI) x is real iff it is not true in virtue of the identity of x (=it is not part of the essence of 
 x) that x exists only if the object of a mental act. 
 The mind-independence of x is compatible with its being necessarily conscious. F. 
Correia (2005) has recently given another definition of dependence in terms of ground, which 
avoids the reference to essences or natures while still excluding the trivial dependence on 
necessary beings. According to him, x depends on y iff “y’s existing helps makes x exist.” 
That is, an entity existentially depends on another when its existence is explained (in an 
objective sense) or grounded in the existence of the other. Then mind-independence can be 
defined as follows: 
 (R) x is real iff its existence is not grounded in its being the object of a mental act. 
 There are important differences between EI and FI but they don’t seem to be crucial 
for our problem of realism about pleasantness.  In both cases, realism about pleasantness is 
                                            
15 In fact their focus is wider since it includes every kind of dependence, not only existential ones. Lowe even 
claims that a purely essential dependence entails existential one, which is rejected by Correia (2005, 2.5.) 
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compatible with the fact that pleasantness is necessarily conscious (or the object of any other 
mental act). 
 One apparent way to be anti-realist about pleasantness, is to claim that the 
consciousness of it modifies it. Such a claim has often been endorsed concerning attention. 
Titchener though that one essential feature of pleasantness and unpleasantness, was their lack 
of clearness. By this he means that pleasantness can’t be attended to without being destroyed:  
 
Attention to an affection is impossible. If it is attempted, the pleasantness or 
unpleasantness at once eludes us and disappears, and we find ourselves attending 
to some obstrusive sensation or idea that e had not the slightest desire to observe 
(Titchener, 1908: 69). 
 
 He quotes a close passage of Külpe: 
While pleasure and pain are brought far more vividly to consciousness by the 
concentration of attention upon their concomitant sensations, they disappear 
entirely when we succeed (and we can succeed only for a moment) in making the 
feeling as such the object of attentive observation. (Külpe, quoted by Titchener, 
1908: 71). 
 
 But here again, it is not clear that such remarks can’t be accounted for in a realist view 
of pleasantness. Maybe the reason why pleasantness disappears when attended to lies in the 
power of attention, not in the essence of pleasantness. Charland (2005) has recently proposed 
a clear defence of pleasantness anti-realism. According to him, pleasantness (or hedonic 
valence) is not an intrinsic property of affect, but depends on the attentional mechanisms 
directed at those affects. A same affects isn’t by itself positive or negative: its polarity 
depends on the way we attend to it. Such a view is clearly anti-realist about pleasantness: 
pleasantness essentially dependent on an attentional act directed at it.  
As a conclusion, pleasantness realism is a possible option. The axiological view of pleasantess 
is a form of hedonic realism: hedonic doesn’t existentially depend on their being represented. 
 
Scepticism about pleasantness: is pleasantness a natural property? 
  
 By raising the question of the unity of generic pleasures, I  assume that pleasantness is 
a natural property. That is, it is assumed that all pleasant states share a same property of 
pleasantness, or at least ressemble each other to some degree with respect to pleasantness. 
This assumption is controversial though. One may subsume under “pleasantness” a 
heterogeneous class of phenomena. There may be different types of pleasantnesses, so that 
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“pleasantness” refers only to a disjunction of miscellaneous phenomena. Note that the idea 
here is not (only) that there are different types of positive affects  (=different type of generic 
pleasures) but (mainly) that there a different ways for affects to be positive (=different types 
of pleasantnesses). We may call disjunctive views of pleasantness, the definitions that take the 
following general form: 
 
x is pleasant=df x is F or x is G or… (where F and G refers to any pleasant mental 
  phenomena). 
 
The most extreme disjunctive view of pleasantness will include in the disjunction each 
of the positive affect, so that to say that x is pleasant is only to say that x is joy, or x is bodily 
pleasure, or x is gladness, or x is felicity, and so on. Not attempt is made at all to unify this 
different phenomena.  
Moderate disjunctive views of pleasantness are more interesting. Though they all 
agree that there are at least two disjoined form of pleasantness they nevertheless strive to limit 
the number of disjuncts by reducing some pleasures to other.  
 
A first moderate disjunctive view of pleasure that is worth to mention is the one 
defended by Perry (1967). According to him, a pleasure is either something that one enjoys, 
or something that one is pleased about. 
 
D11 x is pleasant=df x the object of enjoyment, or x is the object of being pleased by. 
 
The main difference between those two attitudes, Perry argues, is that enjoyment isn’t 
an evaluative attitude, while being pleased by entails that one believe or judge that the object 
of our pleasure is valuable. One can enjoy a movie without believing it has any positive value, 
but what pleases us is always attributed a positive value. Perry then writes: 
 
“No general definition of pleasure will be attempted, for even though the 
notions of enjoyment and being pleased about can both be expressed by the same 
forms of words containing the term “pleasure” they are radically different 
concepts. (1967: 192) 
 
But the two principal versions of moderate disjunctive view of pleasantness comes 
from considerations concerning the specific place of bodily sensations in a theory of generic 
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pleasures. One first common account is to reduce the pleasantness of positive affect to the 
pleasantness of the bodily sensations it is correlated with. This account still makes 
pleasantness a disjunctive property because while the pleasantness of bodily sensation is taken 
to be primitive, the pleasantness of other positive affect is analysable in term of their 
correlation with primitively pleasant bodily sensation:  
 
D12 x is pleasant=df x is a pleasant bodily sensation or x is correlated with some 
pleasant bodily sensations (A. Bain, W. James, Lange, L. B., Hoisington,  G.E. 
Moore, R. Chisholm, 1986: 17-32; A. Damasio, 1994) 
 
In mere tender emotion not sexual, there is nothing but the sense of touch to 
gratify, unless we assume the occult magnetic influences. … In a word, our 
love pleasures begin and end win sensual contact. Touch is both the alpha 
and omega of affection. As the terminal and satisfying sensation, the nec 
plus ultra, it must be a pleasure of the highest degree. A. Bain16. 
 
 
Note that the type of correlation involved varies in the different theories. One can 
maintain that the mere association of a mental attitude with hedonic bodily feeling is 
sufficient. But one may require, as Chisholm do that the mental attitude causes the bodily 
feelings. (Feldman, 1997, and Chisholm, 1986, attribute this view to Brentano, but Olson 
convincingly argues that Brentano view was close to the attitudinal view of D4). 
The second principal moderate disjunctive of pleasantness is in a sense opposed the 
this one. While bodily feelings are taken in D12 to be the basic hedonic phenomena, in terms 
of which the pleasantness of intellectual acts should be analysed, the next definition take the 
attitude of taking pleasure in to be fundamental: 
 
D13 x is pleasant=df x is a primitive attitude of taking pleasure in (D4) or x is a 
pleasant bodily sensation. 
 
 According to this definition, their would be two fundamentally different types of 
pleasures: the ones being intentional, the other being non-intentional. Such a difference 
between intentional and non-intentional pleasures was first noted by Husserl (RL, V, II, §15). 
Sensory pleasures, he claims, are closer are closer to sensory content (he also uses the term 
                                            
16 Bain, quoted by James, Principles, vol 2, footnote, p. 551. 
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“sensations”) such as redness or hardness than to intentional acts such as judgments or 
volitions. On the other hand many pleasures are clearly intentional: the pleasure we take in 
hearing a melody for instance. This  suggests the existence of two strongly heterogeneous 
types of pleasures: 
But we are led to doubt, then, whether two such sorts of ‘feelings’ really form a 
single class. We spoke previously of ‘feelings’ of liking and dislike, of approval 
and disapproval, of valuation and disvaluation — experiences obviously akin to 
theoretical acts of assent and rejection, of taking something to be probable or 
improbable, or to deliberative acts of judgmental or voluntary decision etc. Here 
we have a kind, a plain unity of essence, which included nothing but acts, where 
such sensations of pain and pleasure have no place: descriptively the latter belong, 
in virtue of their specific essence, among tactual, gustatory, olfactory and other 
sensations. Being at best presentative contents of objects of intention, but not 
themselves intentions, they manifest descriptive differences so essential, that we 
cannot seriously believe in the unity of a genuine class. (RL, V, II, §15, p. 573). 
 
 C. Stumpf (1907), defends a close view. He contrasts Gefühlempfindungen  
(“emotional/affective/algedonic sensations”17) which includes bodily and sensory pleasure and 
pains, with Gefühle (“emotions”)18. Affective sensations, he claims, are mere sensations, on a 
par with sensations of the special senses such as temperatures, colours, tones, odors, or taste. 
They have no intentionality, but only happen to be conjoined with other sensations. On the 
opposite, emotions are understood as evaluation caused by judgment of value and that are 
themselves intentionally related to the content of those judgments. 
 M. Scheler (1973: 255 sqq.) also contrasts “feeling of something” (such as suffering, 
enduring, enjoying…) with “mere feeling-states”. Like Husserl and Stumpf, Scheler urges 
that feelings-states have not intrinsic intentionality, contrary to “feeling of something”. But 
contrary to Husserl and Stumpf, he includes in non-intentional feelings more than mere bodily 
and sensory feelings. Anger, he says, is a non-intentional feeling: “The connection of anger 
with the “about” of my anger is not intentional or original. … It is quite diffeent when I 
“rejoice in something,” or when I “am sad about something” or enthusiastic about something” 
(Scheler, 1973: 257). 
 More recently, F. Feldman (1997, 2004) has argued in favour of a distinction between 
attitudinal (or propositional) and sensory pleasures : 
 A person experiences sensory pleasure at a time if he feels pleasurable 
sensations then… sensory pleasures are ‘feelings’ — things relevantly like 
                                            
17 The translation « Emotional sensations » was proposed by C. Stumpf himself, Titchener (1908 : 338, n. 5) 
prefers the translations « affective sensations » or « algedonic sensations ». 
18 For a presentation of Stumpf’s view about affective sensations and emotions, see Titchener (1908, lecture III) ; 
K. Mulligan (1988) and R. Reisenzein & W. Schönpflug (1992). 
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feelings of heat and cold, feelings of pressure, tickles, and itches; the feeling you 
get in your back when getting a massage. 
Attitudinal pleasures are different. A person takes attitudinal pleasure in some 
state of affairs if he enjoys it, is pleased about it, is glad, that it is happening, is 
delighted by it. … Attitudinal pleasures are always directed onto objects, just as 
beliefs and hopes and fears are directed onto objects. This is one respect in which 
they are different from sensory pleasures. Another difference is that attitudinal 
pleasures need not have any “feel”. We know we have them not by sensation, but 
in the same way (whatever it may be) that we know when we believe something, 
or hope for it, of fear that it might happen (2004: 56-7) 
 
 Feldman (1997) insists that attitudinal and sensory pleasures are “two different 
hedonic phenomena”. This raises the main worry for disjunctive view of pleasantness: in 
virtue of what are both types of phenomena (intentional vs non-intentional pleasures) 
phenomena of a same pleasure kind? How are we to define this hedonic kind otherwise than 
by an arbitrary disjunction? 
 Upholder of a disjunctive view of pleasantness, of course want to argue that there is 
here no more here than a disjunction of heterogeneous phenomena and that such a question is 
mistaken. There is nothing in common, as Husserl insists, between intentional and non-
intentional pleasures, except that they are referred to by the same name. But if such an error-
theory concerning our use of the term “pleasure” is true, upholder of the disjunctive view of 
pleasantness owe us an explanation of the source of this mistake. If the two kinds of 
phenomena are so heterogenous, we do we persist in calling them by the same name? 
 One important answer, put forward by F. Feldman is akin to the explanation we gave 
of the existence of a mental and a physical sense of pleasantness. In the same way that 
“pleasant” is said of mental states and by derivation of their external object, it may be that 
attitudinal pleasure is the basic hedonic phenomena, and that sensory pleasures are pleasant in 
virtue of being the objects of attitudinal pleasure.  
 
 My answer to the linkage question is, roughly, this: when we say that a person 
experiences sensory pleasure, what we mean is that there is a sensation such that 
he then takes a certain sort of propositional pleasure in the fact that he has that 
sensation. (Feldman, 1997: 96) 
 
Feldman’s view is that the sensory pleasure can be conceptually analysed in terms of 
attitudinal pleasures. More precisely, sensory pleasures are given an anti-realist definition: 
they are pleasures in virtue of being the object of a certain attitude. Pleasantness, in Feldman’s 
account, is clearly a disjunctive property: it refers either to a real type of intentional attitude, 
or to an unreal class of non-intentional sensations. Though disjunctive and heterogeneous, 
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nevertheless, pleasantness is not an arbitrary property, since one of its disjunct can be 
analysed in terms of the other. That both type of phenomena are called pleasure is therefore 
not a complete accident. 
 Though I agree that pleasantness isn’t a natural property insofar as it applies to both 
mental and physical states, I maintain that mental pleasantness refers to a natural property, 
contrary to Husserl, Stumpf, Scheler or Feldman. There is one unique sense in which mental 
phenomena are pleasant (in the generic sense), and this is this sense I shall try to define. I 
shall explain in chapter xx why I disagree with the view that pleasure is either intentional or 
non-intentional pleasure. Briefly, upholders of this distinction are making two mistakes. First, 
it is wrong to think that sensory, or bodily pleasures (which are often confused) aren’t 
intrinsically intentional. I shall argue that bodily pleasures, as well as bodily pains, are 
directed at some state of the body distinct from themselves. Second, I shall raise some doubts 
against positing primitive hedonic attitudes, such as “taking pleasure in” or “enjoying”. Types 
of mental acts aren’t primitive: they should be analysed in terms of (i) types of their direction 
of fit (ii) types of their intentional objects (iii) types of intrinsic non-intentional property they 
exemplify (qualia, values). (iv) types of modes of presentation of their object. While some of 
these criteria fail to distinguish hedonic attitudes from non-hedonic ones, those that manage to 
ground the distinction lead to other definitions of pleasantness. For instance, if hedonic 
attitudes are attitudes that exemplify a primitive phenomenological qualia, then attitudinal 
pleasure (D4) is to be analysed in terms of hedonic tone (D2). Once both the intentional 
nature of bodily pleasures and the analysability of attitudinal pleasures is recognised, it 
appears that both can be subsumed under a same definition of pleasantness. The thesis I 
defend is that the right definition of pleasantness is the axiological one: pleasantness is a basic 
value, and pleasures are to be defined as the mental states that exemplify an hedonic value. 
 
 
 A preliminary defence of the axiological view of pleasantness 
 
The general aim of this thesis is then to answer to unity problem concerning the generic 
concept of pleasure: what do all positive affects have in common? The answer I endorse is 
that all positive affects exemplify an hedonic value. I shall in this last section sketch four 
types of arguments in favour of this axiological view.  
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 (1) The first argument is negative: it is that all the other definition of pleasantness fail. 
Therefore, one chief task will be to review the different definition of pleasantness and to 
explain the reason of there failure. 
 (2) The second argument in favour the view that pleasantness is an axiological 
property is that it gives the most straightforward and simple explanation of the common view 
that pleasures have intrinsic positive value: namely, because pleasantness is an intrinsic 
positive value. One should admit in our axiology hedonic values on a par with aesthetic and 
epistemic ones (moral values being, as the consequentialist has it, properties of those actions 
that maximizes the quantity of aesthetic, epistemic, and hedonic values exemplified in the 
world).  
 (3) A third argument in favour of the view that pleasantness is a value, is the following 
one: 
  
 (i) Polarity is an exclusive property of values. 
 (ii) Pleasantness is nothing else that the polarity of affects19. 
 Therefore pleasantness is a value. 
  
 In order to defend (i) one has to deal with putative counterexamples such as physical 
polarity (positrons vs electrons) or mathematical one (negative vs positive numbers). Quickly, 
the main answer is to point out that though positrons and electrons, or negative and positive 
numbers are clearly polar opposite, the question “which of the two pole is the positive one, 
which is the negative one” can only receive an arbitrary, conventional answer (a positron isn’t 
intrinsically good or better than an electron, so that is deserve the term positive). This is not so 
with values: not only beauty is the polar opposite of ugliness, beauty is also essentially 
positive: that beauty is better than ugliness isn’t a matter of arbitrary choice.  In order to 
defend (ii), one can use an argument by subtraction: once the intentional object and the 
polarity of pleasant experiences is taken up, nothing is left, or so it seems.  
 
 (4) A fourth argument in favour of the axiological view of pleasantness goes as 
follows: 
                                            
19 Titchener (1908: p. 56 qq and p. 77) come close to this view. He claims that “qualitative antagonism” is one 
essential property of feelings (that is, of pleasantness and unpleasantness). The only other essential property of 
feeling he admit is their lack of clearness, that is, the fact that feelings disppears when they are attended to.  
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 (i) Dx, the view that pleasantness is an phenomenological primitive property is the 
 most plausible view apart from the axiological view. 
 (ii) But Dx cannot avoid saying that pleasantness is a mental but non-intentional 
 property. 
 (iii) Intentionality is our only acceptable definition of the mental. 
 Therefore pleasantness should be a primitive property of mental states that is non 
 mental. The only plausible option seems to be that it is an axiological property. 
 
 The axiological view of pleasantness raises some worries, nevertheless. Here are some 
of the main objections to it, with a brief sketch of the possible answers. 
 (1) A first problem concerns the relation between pleasure and consciousness. Pleasure 
is often said to be necessarily conscious. But if pleasantness is not a phenomenological 
property, such a claim is threatened. As a first answer, it may be, as we have ssen before, that 
the reason why pleasure is necessarily conscious, if it is, is not to be found in the essence of 
pleasure but in the essence of consciousness: consciousness is essentially pleasure-attracted. 
Second, it is worth noting that even if every pleasures are conscious, many of them can still be 
sub-attentional: there may be many “background pleasures” (S. Rachles, 2000). 
 (ii) A second problem concerns the relation between the pleasantness of positive affect 
and the value of their intentional objects. Claiming that pleasantness is an axiological property 
implies that it is not intentionally directed towards an object distinct from itself (values have 
no intentionality). If so, the unpleasantness of our fear doesn’t represent the danger of the dog, 
but is merely a reaction or response to it. This raises some worries because we nevertheless 
want to maintain that it is incorrect or inappropriate to feel pleasant emotions towards 
negative values (for instance in malicious pleasures such as Schadenfreude). As an answer, I 
try to argue that such incorrectness is not to be understood in terms of misrepresentation, but 
as violation of certain moral norms.  
 (iii) A third problem concerns the intuition that there must be some necessary link 
between pleasure and desire. The way I reject of conative views of pleasure (that reduces 
pleasure either to a desired state, or to desire’s satisfaction), commits me to deny that there is 
any straightforward conceptual link between pleasure in the generic sense and desires 
understood generically as dispositions to act. Should we give up the intuition that pleasure and 
desire are somehow linked? 
 As an answer, it is still possible to make sense of the more modest claim that some 
(specific) pleasures are necessarily link with some (specific) desires. The first candidates are 
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pleasures of satisfaction. Denying that all pleasures are pleasures of satisfaction is of course 
compatible with claiming that some pleasures are pleasures of satisfaction. Nevertheless, I 
argue that though it is commonly agreed that desire’s satisfactions are pleasant, this is not 
always so. As a consequence, the question “why is it pleasant to satisfy one’s desire” merits 
some attention. I raise some sceptical worry about the very existence of such a primitive kind 
of pleasures of satisfaction, as distinct from (a) pleasure of relief (the end of a painful desire), 
(b) second-order feeling of pride or power, (c) mere enjoyment of the object of desire (which 
could have been experienced without any preceding desire), (d) pleasure in activity. 
 Pleasure in activity constitutes the second candidate of specific pleasure linked by 
necessity with desires. Pleasures in activity are the pleasures we sometimes take in pursuing a 
goal, by contrast to pleasure of attainment of this goal. We enjoy playing even if we finally 
lose the game. I argue that pleasure in activity is always a mixed feeling, the pleasure we take 
in activity being dependent on the unpleasant effort we have to overtake (too easy games 
aren’t pleasant). 
 Finally, hedonic desires (desire for pleasure) though they don’t constitute all desires 
(contra psychological hedonism) are essentially link with pleasure. If pleasantness is indeed a 
basic type of value, hedonic desires are certainly appropriate or correct, ceteris paribus. I 
argued that hedonic desires, pace psychological hedonists, essentially involve high cognitive 
abilities such as make-believe or pretence. Looking for pleasure is not a natural and 
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